Report of Myron C. Taylor to the Secretary of State in Washington about the Evian Conference, July 20, 1938
Source : John Mendelsohn (ed.), The Holocaust, Vol. 5, (New-York 1982), p. 249-64.
...On July 5, our delegation took up quarters at Evian. That evening Lord Winterton and Sir Michael Palairet arrived by plane from London and dined with me. In the course of the conversation they took a very strong stand in behalf of the League Commission and said that they could not agree to any machinery which would diminish in any respect the standing of Sir Neill Malcolm, or his organisation... I said that while our Government was anxious that the organisation which we proposed to set up and the League Commission should collaborate and be complementary, we would not be able to agree to participate in an advisory body to the League commission such as the British Delegate described. I might observe at this point that we had already been made aware of the fact that the League Secretariat was hostile in the extreme to the Evian meeting and was most anxious to have it fail. I do not believe that this was the attitude of the Secretary General, M. Avenol; in fact I was assured by Governor Winant, who very kindly came to see me on the afternoon of July 5, that the Secretary General saw definite advantage in the Evian meeting; it was, however, distinctly the attitude of the League bureaucracy as a whole, notably of Major Abrams, who has in charge the refugee activities of the League. I learned from various sources that he was extremely active in stirring up hostility to the meeting, particularly among the Latin American Delegates over whom the League Secretariat has great influence. In any event, the British Delegates decided with us that it would be advisable to appoint an informal drafting committee to consider the resolution and when it had reached an agreement on a text to report to the chiefs of the delegations. This drafting committee should consist of Mr. Makins, for the British Delegation; M. Bressy, for the French Delegation, and Mr. Pell for the American Delegation... The opening session of the meeting took place on the afternoon of July 6, with M. Berenger in the Chair... Beginning the evening of July 6, and for several days thereafter, Pell, Makins and Bressy laboured to find the text of a resolution upon which they could agree. Makins was inclined at first to take a very rigid stand against our text. Bressy supported him throughout and in addition made it clear that the French Government would not agree to the presence of the Intergovernmental Committee in Paris, on the ground that it would attract undesirable elements and would prove an embarrassment in French relations with Germany. On the evening of July 7, Lord Winterton invited me to dine with him...The evident object of this dinner was to persuade us into an acceptance of their concept of the Intergovernmental Committee as an advisory body to the League Commission...At this point I...said frankly that there was no object in our deceiving one another; that we would not accept a subordinate position for the Intergovernmental body; that it seemed to me that the two organisations could very usefully be complementary and that there was plenty of room for the activity of both. I then outlined in detail our plan for a Committee with a British Chairman, four Vice-Chairmen, and an American Director, and made a strong plea to Lord Winterton for an understanding of our aim. Lord Winterton seemed to be tremendously impressed. His whole attitude changed immediately.... In the conversations with Pell and Bressy over the wekend, Makins was decidedly more co-operative, so that by noon of July 11, he, Pell and Bressy had reached an agreement on a text...which was then referred for consideration to Senator Berenger, Lord Winterton and myself. It was then that by a display of very great seriousness and firmness we eliminated the clause, which made the League services (Commission and Nansen Office) members of our Committee. In view of the pushing character of Sir Neill Malcolm and Dr. Hansson, we were convinced that they would be too active and might make much trouble. We modified a few passages and then Winterton and Berenger said that since the meeting was called on American initiative and I was Chairman, I should do the negotiating with the other Delegations in order that there might not be any differentiation between them. During the next twenty-four hours I saw the representatives of every Delegation, first singly then in groups...After considerable shifting of words and redrafting of phrases, we were able to draw up a text which appeared to be acceptable to all Delegations. I then held an off-the-record meeting of Chiefs of Delegations in my office, at which we discussed the Resolution paragraph by paragraph, and made further minor changes in phraseology. We seemed to be in agreement when a group of Latin American representatives, notably the Central American Delegates and the Delegates of Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay and Chile came to me with the tale that they were not able to approve the Resolution, explaining that they were under heavy pressure from Germany on account of the barter agreements, and that in this situation they thought it preferable to make a complete reservation of their position. I attempted to persuade them to change their minds, explaining what an unfortunate effect an apparent difference of views would have and assuring them that there was nothing in the Resolution as drafted which could possibly offend Germany. This led us to have a second and larger meeting in my office the following (Wednesday) morning. We again read the Resolution...I had already stated many times that the Resolution as phrased was a recommendation. The objection continued, however, until, finally, on the suggestion of Mr. Lobo, who was invaluable in seconding my efforts, I agreed to make a statement to the effect that each country could decide in its sovereign right how far it would take action on the basis of the Resolution.... On the following morning, July 15, we held the closing session, when I made the statement which I telegraphed to you in my No. 24, July 15, 12 noon, and Lord Winterton, then Senator Berenger, spoke. Other speakers were Judge Hansson, the Chairman of the Technical Committee and M. Costa du Rels, of Bolivia, who made strong pro-League statements which led to a request by Lord Winterton that the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Meeting be communicated to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. After the speeches were concluded, I proposed that Senator Berenger, as Honorary Chairman, should take the Chair and dismiss the Meeting. He was evidently delighted to do so and delivered a charming and highly laudatory address. The Meeting closed with the fullest evidence of good-will all around and a desire to achieve a concrete result. I believe that the friendly atmosphere was in part influenced by the fact that I, as Chairman, made a point of entertaining at one time or another all the principal delegates and their staffs. This created a more favourable atmosphere and enabled me to make several speeches off the record in which I made the humanitarian and emotional appeal which it was difficult for me to do in the public sessions. I was very much impressed with the increasing seriousness with which the work was conducted as the meeting progressed, and I am happy to say that it concluded on a very high note. I should add that two subcommittees were set up by the Intergovernmental Committee: the first was the subcommittee set up to hear the representatives of private organizations and to receive their memoranda. The Chairman of this Subcommittee was Lieutenant-Colonel White, of Australia; Mr. MacDonald represented us. This Subcommittee heard a representative of every private organization which had registered with the Secretary General. They then delegated to the Secretary General, M. Paul-Boncour, who was assisted by Mr. Stirling, of Australia, the task of drawing up a synopsis of the views of the private bodies. At the last minute this sywhich had been shown to us was mysteriously suppressed... the second Subcommittee was the technical group, which had as chairman Judge Hansson, and had the duty of hearing a statement of the laws and practices of each country with regard of the laws and practices of each country with regard to political refugees, and statement of the number and type of immigrants which each country was prepared to receive. Mr. Brandt represented us on this Subcommittee and, in fact, he together with Mr. Cooper of the British Delegation, did the greatest part of the work and prepared the final report and the Resolution based on it. At the meeting on July 8, Brandt presented to the Technical Subcommittee the statement of our immigration policy which was previously approved by the Department...In this connection I should observe that after Brandt had made his statement, he was roundly attacked by Sir Neill Malcolm, the League High Commissioner, who implied that we should not have called this Meeting unless we were prepared to modify our immigration laws. I think it is only frank to state that Sir Neill Malcolm's attitude during the whole proceedings was one of open hostility. Sir Neill, as you may know, is a semi-invalid, who does the work of the League Commission in time which he can spare from his duties as head of the North Borneo Company. In actual fact, the work is done by his Turkish assistant, Mr. Erim, who is a member of the League Secretariat, and by Lord Duncannon, a young boy of some ability who has just left college and is preparing to run for Parliament. As far as I can make out, Sir Neill's chief virtue is that he obeys the orders of the British Foreign Office and of the League Secretariat without question, and does not even attempt to act independently. The consencus among the private organizations is that Sir Neill is pleasant but of little real value and that it would be a tragedy were he to be chosen as the Permanent High Commissioner of the League, as apparently he and the British Government wish. I have the impression that Judge Hansson is another candidate for the permanent High Commissionership. He is an agreeable, pleasant spoken man, but proved to be completely ineffective as Chairman of the Technical Subcommittee. Very evidently he is not in the good favour of the British.
CONCLUSIONS
As I look over the situation, I am satisfied that we accomplished the purpose for which the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian ΓÇô which we consistently regarded as an initial session ΓÇô was called. We have obtained approval of machinery, which should prove effective, if skilfully used, to alleviate the conditions of political refugees; we have established the continuity of governmental effort through the agreement of the British to hold a further meeting at London on August 3. We have laid the groundwork for the Director who will find that the way is paved for him to engage in negotiation with Germany immediately upon his arrival. We have done what is equally important: we have won the British, the French and others over to the idea of doing something immediately to deal with the situation which, if allowed to develop in major proportions might prove disastrous. I have every confidence that Lord Winterton and Senator Berenger are now fired with real enthusiasm for this work and are prepared to continue an active and constructive interest. I find many of our Latin American colleagues extremely troublesome. They have nothing constructive to offer and enter objection after objection, in many cases for purpose of self-advertisement. Notable exceptions are M. Lobo, of Brazil, and Ambassador Le Breton, of the Argentine, who are both men of experience and wisdom. Undoubtedly there will be a tendency on the part of some Latin American governments to separate themselves from this work in its continued form at London, and I think it should be weighed whether their value as countries of settlement is sufficiently great to warrant our urging them to come, if it is to be merely for the purpose of blocking progress... With regard to the projected negotiations with Germany, some evidence has reached me that there is at least a disposition in certain German quarters to co-operate in an orderly solution of this problem. Of course, the approach to the German Government will have to be very carefully prepared... It is clear from the evidence, which we have at hand that disaster lies ahead unless the Germans can be persuaded to regulate emigration to countries of final settlement in an orderly manner. At the present time there is very little possibility of large scale settlement of political refugees. The process of infiltration may be accelerated somewhat, but not to an extent, which will permit the absorption of hundreds of thousands of involuntary emigrants from Germany, and after them from other points in Central Europe. It is absolutely essential therefore that the German Government should collaborate, if it wishes in fact to solve its problem and not to reduce the undesirables in its population, that is undesirable from its point of view, to the status of little better than serfs... Interest focuses naturally on the Director, and all are hopeful that he will be able to make a successful approach to the German Government. Great importance is attached to the fact that he is an American, since all are agreed that because of political involvement in one sense or another, the national of another country could not succeed. In conclusion, I am convinced that it is of the highest importance to maintain the continuity of this work and not to let it drop for a single instant. It has got off to a good start; it must be carried on in the spirit of the Evian meeting and with the same energy and determination.
